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SEXUAL ASSAULT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES: 
SEEKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE 
BETWEEN DUE PROCESS AND VICTIM 
PROTECTION 
MATTHEW R. TRIPLETT† 
ABSTRACT 
  Peer sexual assault is a significant problem on American college 
and university campuses. On April 4, 2011, the Office for Civil Rights 
of the Department of Education sought to address this problem by 
issuing a new “Dear Colleague Letter” that provided enhanced 
guidance on how educational institutions should adjudicate such 
incidents. The letter has the perverse effect of complicating matters 
further by blurring the already fine line between victim protection and 
due process for the accused, and it exposes a potential liability trap for 
educational institutions. This Note explains why the law surrounding 
victim protection and due process is difficult for institutions to apply 
and argues that the Department of Education should produce a model 
judicial policy so that institutions, victims, and accused students will 
have more certainty in this complicated arena. In furtherance of such 
a policy, this Note offers specific due-process protections for accused 
students that should be embraced by educational institutions and the 
Department of Education alike. 
INTRODUCTION 
Student-on-student sexual assault is a significant problem on 
college and university campuses,1 as demonstrated by several highly 
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 1. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS, CHRISTINE H. LINDQUIST, TARA D. WARNER, BONNIE S. 
FISHER & SANDRA L. MARTIN, THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY: FINAL 
REPORT, at xviii (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf (finding 
that one in five women are victims of sexual assault while in college). 
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publicized episodes at well-known institutions of higher education.2 
As colleges and universities pursue effective means of targeting this 
problem, many schools have themselves become targets of legal 
action. Both sexual-assault victims as well as alleged perpetrators 
have sued their schools for failing to provide sufficient investigative 
and judicial proceedings when responding to accusations of assault.3 
Some of these cases have resulted in significant judgments against 
universities.4 
On April 4, 2011, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the 
Department of Education (DOE) addressed the issue of campus 
sexual assault by issuing a new “Dear Colleague Letter”5 that 
 
 2. See, e.g., Grayson Sang Walker, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine on Peer 
Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 95–98 (2010) (discussing the well-publicized 
Tiffany Williams case at the University of Georgia); Ben Eisen, A Rape Case That’s Not Going 
Away, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 19, 2009, 3:00 AM), http://insidehighered.com/news/2009/
06/19/assault (describing an alleged gang rape at the University of the Pacific). 
 3. See, e.g., Christina Huffington, Yale Students File Title IX Complaint Against University, 
YALE HERALD, Mar. 31, 2011, http://yaleherald.com/topstory/breaking-news-yale-students-file-
title-ix-suit-against-school (“The Department of Education’s Office for Civil 
Rights . . . announced . . . it will open an investigation to review Yale’s policies for dealing with 
sexual harassment and sexual assault.”); Elyse Ashburn, Education Dept. Tells 2 Colleges To 
Revamp Sexual-Harassment Policies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://
chronicle.com/article/Education-Dept-Tells-2/125704 (discussing settlements between the 
Department of Education (DOE) and Eastern Michigan University and Notre Dame College in 
which the institutions would revamp their efforts to comply with Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1686 (2006), to avoid further investigations); Allie 
Grasgreen, Wrong People on Trial?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 7, 2011, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/06/07/women_raise_questions_about_university_judi
cial_hearings_under_title_ix (discussing victims’ lawsuits against educational institutions). 
 4. See, e.g., Found. for Individual Rights in Educ., In Verdict Against Sewanee, Federal 
Jury Sends Important Message About Proper Handling of Sexual Assault Cases, MORAL 
LIBERAL (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.themoralliberal.com/2011/09/06/in-verdict-against-
sewanee-federal-jury-sends-important-message-about-proper-handling-of-sexual-assault-cases 
(“In a decision that should send some rumblings through the world of higher education . . . the 
jury awarded $26,500 in compensatory damages to the former student for [the institution’s] 
negligence in mishandling his disciplinary hearing [for an alleged sexual assault].”); see also 
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007) (permitting a 
rape victim’s Title IX suit for damages against her former university to proceed). 
 5. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201104.pdf. Dear colleague letters are guidance documents written to educational 
administrators that explain the OCR’s legal positions and enforcement priorities. The letters 
lack the force of congressionally made law, but courts pay them great attention due to deference 
prescribed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See, 
e.g., Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 93 (D. Conn. 2010) (“[T]here seems to be 
little question that this court should defer to [the OCR letters] insofar as they represent OCR’s 
interpretation of its own regulations.”). 
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outlined the procedures that institutions should follow to remain in 
compliance with Title IX,6 the federal statute that prohibits sex 
discrimination in education.7 Many colleges and universities 
responded to the April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter (“Dear 
Colleague Letter”) by amending their procedures for adjudicating 
allegations of sexual assault.8 Meanwhile, the letter itself has sparked 
a debate about the appropriate balance between protecting victims of 
assault and ensuring adequate due process for the accused in the 
context of campus adjudications.9 Scholars such as Professor Peter 
Berkowitz of Stanford University criticized the letter as an affront to 
 
 6. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1686 (2006). 
 7. See id. § 1681 (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be . . . subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance . . . .”). 
 8. See, e.g., Luc Cohen, U. Redefines Sexual Misconduct, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, Sept. 27, 
2011, at 1 (discussing changes to the term “sexual assault” in Princeton University’s sexual-
misconduct policies); Michelle Davis, U.Va. Alters Rules for Sexual Misconduct, CAVALIER 
DAILY (Univ. of Va.), Aug. 20, 2011, at A1 (“The University [of Virginia] redefined the 
circumstances under which a student can raise sexual assault charges in July, altering its policy 
from one of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ to a broader standard in which an incident of sexual 
misconduct more likely than not occurred.”); Michael Goodrich, Op-Ed., Justice in the 
Academy, CHRONICLE (Duke Univ.), Sept. 7, 2011, at 11 (“[A]lleged violations of university 
policy that fall under Title IX . . . will now be resolved using the preponderance of evidence 
standard . . . .” (quoting Stephen Bryan, Associate Dean of Students at Duke University) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lee Shearer, UGA Toughens Sexual Harassment Policy, 
ONLINEATHENS (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/091611/uga_886443218
.shtml (“The University of Georgia has adopted a new, tougher sexual harassment policy that 
for the first time explicitly defines sexual violence as a violation of UGA policy.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Peter Berkowitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male 
Guilt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2011, at A13 (“Most egregiously, OCR requires universities to 
render judgment using ‘a preponderance of the evidence’ standard.” (quoting Letter from 
Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 11)); Rick Hills, What Constitutes “Due Process” for the Accused 
in Universities’ Hearings Dealing with Campus Rape?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 21, 2011), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/08/what-constitutes-due-process-in-universities-
campus-rape-adjudications.html (“But Peter [Berkowitz] cannot be serious that all of the rights 
appropriate for a criminal case . . . ought to be imported into an administrative hearing . . . .”); 
see also Criticisms of the Department of Education’s April 4, 2011 “Dear Colleague Letter”, 
FALSE RAPE SOC’Y, http://falserapearchives.blogspot.com/2011/09/writings-demonstrating-
error-and.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (maintaining a list of links to documents that have 
disclaimed the Dear Colleague Letter). 
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male students’ due-process rights.10 Others, however, lauded the letter 
for ushering in an era of clarity in the world of Title IX compliance.11 
In the midst of this debate, this Note argues that the Dear 
Colleague Letter suffers from a fatally inadequate discussion of the 
appropriate balance between victim protection and due process. 
Specifically, the document has raised more questions than it has 
answered, leaving the interests of both victims and accused students 
in flux. Because institutions simultaneously face statutory duties to 
respond properly to victims’ claims of assault and constitutional or 
contractual obligations to provide due process to the accused, better-
defined policies—such as those advanced in this Note—are needed. 
Without such guidance, institutions are left with a choice. They may 
closely follow the OCR’s guidelines on victim protection, thereby 
risking possible due-process claims from alleged perpetrators, or they 
may independently attempt to balance victim-protection and due-
process interests and risk Title IX violations for inadequate victim 
protection. Under either approach, institutions face potential 
liability,12 and both victims and alleged perpetrators may be 
insufficiently protected. 
This Note begins by outlining the legal forces at play in peer 
sexual-assault cases. Part I summarizes the campus disciplinary 
process and discusses Title IX, due process, and the Federal 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).13 This analysis reveals 
that a lack of guidance on how these various processes and laws 
interact has produced confusion about how institutions should 
 
 10. Berkowitz, supra note 9; see also Anonymous, An Open Letter to OCR, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2011/10/28/essay-ocr-
guidelines-sexual-assault-hurt-colleges-and-students (telling the OCR that the Dear Colleague 
Letter went “too far”). 
 11. E.g., NCHERM Partners, NCHERM Reaction to the OCR Title IX Dear Colleague 
Letter on Campus Sexual Assault, RISKMABLOG (Apr. 6, 2011), http://riskmablog.blogspot.com/
2011/04/ncherm-reaction-to-ocr-title-ix-dear.html; see also, e.g., Donna Bickford, Brenda 
Betham, Michelle Issadore & Michelle Kroner, Open Letter to Anonymous, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2011/11/08/essay-defending-ocr-letter-
colleges-and-sexual-assault (“We would argue that the OCR guidelines, while not perfect, 
instead provide valuable guidance to campuses looking to support all their students equitably.”); 
Erin Buzuvis, OCR “Dear Colleague” Letter Addresses Sexual Harassment in Schools, TITLE IX 
BLOG (Apr. 6, 2011), http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2011/04/ocr-dear-colleague-letter-addresses
.html (describing the Dear Colleague Letter as a “much-needed reminder” of Title IX’s 
requirements). 
 12. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also infra Part I.B. 
 13. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2011). 
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balance due-process rights and victim protection. In Part II, this Note 
closely examines the Dear Colleague Letter and explains how the 
letter’s guidelines have failed to address the confusion. Part III 
outlines a new approach to adjudicating peer sexual assault that 
includes universal standards on the burden of proof, cross-
examination, discovery, evidentiary matters, and access to counsel. 
This Note embraces several normative views that should be 
noted at the outset. First, students in the aggregate should be entitled 
to consistent due-process protections. Because most students lack 
information about available due process when selecting their future 
alma mater, they need a baseline of protection.14 Second, this Note 
assumes that both institutions and victims would benefit from a 
uniform framework. Only by enabling institutions to confidently 
respond to reports of violence—without fear of liability for violating 
an alleged perpetrator’s due-process rights—will assault victims be 
protected fully. Third, despite recent inflammatory comments to the 
contrary,15 victim protection and due process for the accused are not 
mutually exclusive. Institutions, given appropriate guidance, can 
balance these two interests. Therefore, this Note advocates for certain 
due-process protections, not at the expense of victim protection, but 
so that institutions will have clarity on how to adjudicate sexual-
assault reports and so that the interests of both victims and the 
accused are adequately protected. 
I.  THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: A COMPLICATED WEB OF STATUTORY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND JUDICIAL FORCES 
When college students report to college or university officials 
that they have been sexually assaulted16 by a peer, they immediately 
 
 14. The Supreme Court recognizes a special interest in protecting consumers when 
information about their desired product is not readily available. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“Because the extension of First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the 
information such speech provides, appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not 
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.” (citation omitted)); 
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1981) (“The public’s comparative lack of knowledge . . . renders 
advertising for professional services especially susceptible to abuses that the States have a 
legitimate interest in controlling.”). 
 15. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 16. Although the term “sexual assault” captures a range of behavior, this Note focuses on 
standards for the severest forms of assault, such as completed or attempted rape, in which the 
parties’ interests are greatest. The term “sexual assault” is used throughout this Note to 
reference such conduct. 
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trigger a host of legal obligations for the institution. This Part 
provides an overview of the campus adjudicatory system and explains 
how that system must work in tandem with federal and applicable 
state laws. Section A summarizes the basic campus adjudicatory 
system. Section B provides an overview of the applicable federal laws 
and principles. Section C explains how and why these systems have 
created confusion and tension for college and university 
administrators. 
A. The Campus Adjudicatory System 
At the outset, distinguishing between the campus adjudicatory 
system and the criminal-justice system is important. The Dear 
Colleague Letter addresses only campus adjudicatory procedures at 
colleges and universities throughout the United States.17 The criminal-
justice system, on the other hand, is concerned with criminal 
prosecution. Although the same conduct might be adjudicated in both 
systems, the systems themselves and their attendant levels of victim 
protection and due process are distinct.18 
The methods and procedures of campus adjudicatory systems 
differ across institutions. The procedures can also vary within an 
institution depending on the type of misconduct at issue. Generally, 
however, the institution will have an adjudicatory process that is 
managed by an office of student affairs.19 In addition, all institutions 
are bound by their own policies and procedures vis-à-vis the accused 
and by constitutional due-process mandates, state contract law, 
federal education laws, and the oversight and guidance of the OCR.20 
In a typical sexual-assault adjudication, the accused student first 
receives notice of the charge from the student-affairs office and is 
 
 17. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 2 (“This letter . . . discuss[es] the 
proactive efforts schools can take to prevent sexual harassment and violence . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 18. See id. at 9–10 (“Police investigations may be useful for fact gathering; but because the 
standards for criminal investigations are different, police investigations or reports are not 
determinative of whether sexual harassment or violence violates Title IX.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Disciplinary Procedures, OFFICE OF STUDENT LIFE, DAVIDSON COLL., 
http://www3.davidson.edu/cms/x8912.xml (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (outlining the student 
disciplinary process, as enforced by the Dean of Students); Overview of Process, CTR. FOR 
STUDENT CONDUCT, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, http://campuslife.berkeley.edu/conduct/
process (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (summarizing the process “used to determine if a 
student . . . engaged in behavior that violates the Code of Student Conduct,” as administered by 
the Dean of Students). 
 20. See infra Part I.B. 
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asked to respond, either in writing or in person.21 Next, the accused 
student and the alleged victim appear before a misconduct panel, 
which is akin to a jury and is comprised of a blend of students, faculty, 
or staff.22 This panel hears arguments, makes a factual finding, and, if 
appropriate, assigns a sanction.23 An appellate review is also generally 
available, consisting of faculty members or administrators who 
evaluate a written appeal.24 This appellate review is typically the last 
stage within the institution, though some institutions may allow the 
student or the student’s parents to petition senior officers for relief. 
Students who are dissatisfied with the outcome of the institution’s 
adjudication must resort to the state or federal court system.25 
B. Applicable Laws and Constitutional Principles 
Throughout the campus adjudicatory system, two major bodies 
of law interact to ensure that all parties are represented properly. 
First, Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in higher education.26 
Second, either contractual27 or constitutional due-process rights 
 
 21. See, e.g., Disciplinary Matters, ADMIN. BD., HARVARD COLL., http://www.adboard
.fas.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k62415&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup88722 (last visited Sept. 
25, 2012) (“As a first step in the Board review process students will be informed of the 
allegations by the Secretary of the Board . . . .”); Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 19 (“[The 
formal statement of charges] is to be served on the person charged promptly . . . .”); Overview of 
Process, supra note 19 (“[W]e inform the student of [a report of misconduct] and ask the student 
to schedule a meeting to discuss the incident.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 19 (stating that the Secretary of the 
Honor Council schedules disciplinary hearings); Overview of Process, supra note 19 (“If the 
student . . . prefers to have a hearing . . . the case will be forwarded to a hearing.”). But see 
Disciplinary Matters: Responding to an Allegation Made Against You in a Peer Dispute Case, 
ADMIN. BD., HARVARD COLL., http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k62415&pageid=
icb.page290403 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (discussing an adjudication process that is conducted 
via written reports). 
 23. See Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 19 (“The [Sexual Misconduct] Board’s purpose 
is to hear cases which include allegations of Sexual Misconduct. The Board is charged with 
determining whether the Accused is responsible or not responsible for the alleged conduct and 
determining appropriate sanctions.”). 
 24. E.g., id.; see also, e.g., Overview of Process, supra note 19 (“Appeals may be made in 
writing to the Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs and must be based on new information not 
available at the time of the hearing, significant procedural error, or other good cause.”); 
Reconsideration and Appeals Process, ADMIN. BD., HARVARD COLL., http://isites.harvard.edu/
fs/docs/icb.topic601968.files/Reconsideration%20Appeals%20Flowchart.pdf (last visited Sept. 
25, 2012) (outlining the appeals process). 
 25. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 26. See supra note 7. 
 27. Goodman v. President & Trs. of Bowdoin Coll., 135 F. Supp. 2d 40, 54, 58 (D. Me. 
2001) (“[A] number of opinions by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and other courts 
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require that certain procedures be followed before a student is 
disciplined.28 But these considerations are only the beginning of the 
analysis. Other laws, including FERPA, create additional 
complications in the relationship between Title IX and due process.29 
1. Title IX: Federally Mandated Victim Protection.  Enacted as 
part of the Education Amendments of 1972,30 Title IX31 is one of the 
most important federal statutes in higher education. Along with Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196432 and the Supreme Court’s 
precedent on discrimination generally, Title IX protects college and 
university students from sex-based discrimination by conditioning the 
receipt of federal funds on compliance with the statute.33 In relevant 
part, the statute states, “No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”34 Subsequent legislation 
expanded the scope of the statute to include the entire educational 
institution whenever a single program or school within the institution 
receives federal funding.35 Because virtually every higher-education 
 
within this circuit have endorsed the existence of a contractual relationship between students 
and colleges . . . . [T]he Court holds that [the student] Plaintiff’s contractual relationship with 
Bowdoin includes the Handbook term promising that Bowdoin would abide by certain 
procedures to ensure impartial proceedings and fundamental fairness.”). 
 28. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157–59 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that 
college students at public universities have due-process rights in disciplinary proceedings). 
 29. See infra Part I.B.3. In addition to these laws, the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus 
Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act), 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2011), is implicated by peer sexual assault and requires institutions to maintain and report 
aggregate assault data. This Note does not address the Clery Act, because it does not alter the 
way in which individual judicial proceedings are governed. 
 30. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 7, 12, 20, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 31. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 373 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1686 (2006)). 
 32. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 2252 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4a (2006)) (prohibiting discrimination by 
institutions that receive federal funds). 
 33. See generally KLINTON W. ALEXANDER & KERN ALEXANDER, HIGHER EDUCATION 
LAW: POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES 484–503 (2011) (explaining the importance of Title IX and 
other laws in the context of federal prohibitions on sex discrimination in higher education). 
 34. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). 
 35. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, sec. 3(a), § 908, 102 Stat. 
28, 28 (1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2006)) (“For the purposes of this title, 
the term ‘program or activity’ and ‘program’ mean all of the operations of . . . a college, 
university, or other postsecondary institution . . . .”). 
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institution benefits from federal assistance, the law applies 
universally.36 
When it enacted Title IX, Congress sought to prohibit the “use 
of federal resources to support discriminatory practices and to 
provide individual citizens with effective protection against such 
practices.”37 Although little legislative history exists regarding the 
statute’s intended purpose and scope,38 the law’s structure suggests 
that it was meant to play a similar role as Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, except with a specific focus on sex and the school 
environment.39 Accordingly, the statute applies to a host of activities 
and programs within higher education, including admissions and 
financial aid,40 sexual harassment,41 and athletics.42 
Title IX is enforced and administered by the OCR,43 and the 
OCR has accordingly promulgated official regulations that interpret 
 
 36. David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217, 243 
(2005); see also, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 187–88 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying Title 
IX’s requirements to a private university’s athletics program). 
 37. ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 501. 
 38. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 527–28 (1982) (explaining that 
Title IX “originated as a floor amendment, [and that] no committee report discusses the 
provisions”); Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 
U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 9 n.30 (1992) (“Title IX was adopted without formal 
hearings . . . .”). 
 39. See North Haven Bd. of Ed., 456 U.S. at 528 (explaining that Title IX was seen by some 
as a “cut and paste job” of Title VI (quoting Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. 409 
(1975) (statement of Rep. James G. O’Hara, Chairman, Subcomm. on Postsecondary 
Education))). 
 40. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.21–106.23, 106.37 (2012) (regulating sex discrimination in college 
admissions, recruitment, and financial aid). But see David S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of 
Sex Segregation, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 51, 89–90 (2011) (outlining exceptions to Title IX’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination in educational admissions). 
 41. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005). 
 42. See generally Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 291 Fed. App’x. 517 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (discussing the promulgation of regulations by the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare that extend the applicability of Title IX to intercollegiate athletic activities); Favia 
v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming a preliminary injunction that compelled 
a university to reinstate athletics programs that had been cut in violation of Title IX); Cohen v. 
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying regulations that implement the 
intercollegiate athletics provisions of Title IX to a suit brought by members of women’s sports 
teams that had been dropped to intercollegiate club status). 
 43. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html (last updated June 18, 2012); see also 
34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) (2012) (“If the Assistant Secretary [for Civil Rights] finds that a recipient 
has discriminated against persons on the basis of sex in an education program or activity, such 
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and expound upon the statute itself.44 In addition, the OCR and the 
DOE issue dear colleague letters and other publications that provide 
clarification to administrators on complicated and timely compliance 
issues.45 These documents offer important guidance on the 
enforcement strategies of the OCR and the DOE, and courts give 
Chevron deference to reasonable interpretations of Title IX found in 
dear colleague letters.46 
Although the statute itself contains no reference to student-on-
student sexual assault, courts have applied Title IX to such gender 
violence by defining sexual assault as a type of sex discrimination.47 
Courts have also considered institutional liability in the presence of 
deliberate indifference to student-on-student sexual assault.48 To 
establish deliberate indifference and to trigger institutional liability, 
the victim must show that a relevant institutional official had actual 
notice of the assault and refused to take appropriate action.49 The 
possibility of liability incentivizes higher-education institutions to be 
proactive in addressing accusations of sexual assault. Yet despite 
 
recipient shall take such remedial action as the Assistant Secretary deems necessary to 
overcome the effects of such discrimination.”). 
 44. See generally 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1–106.71 (regulating sex discrimination in higher 
education pursuant to Title IX). 
 45. See Reading Room, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed
.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/publications.html#General (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (listing and 
providing electronic access to dear colleague letters and other official documents promulgated 
by the OCR). 
 46. See, e.g., Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 92 (D. Conn. 2010) 
(explaining that courts are “bound to defer to OCR’s interpretation of Title IX” in a dear 
colleague letter and that OCR regulations are “owed ‘particularly high deference’ under the 
doctrine of Chevron” (quoting McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 
F.3d 275, 288 (2d Cir. 2004))). 
 47. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999) (concluding that 
“deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment . . . amounts to an intentional violation of 
Title IX”). 
 48. See e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290–91 (1998) (“[W]e 
hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who . . . has authority to 
address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf 
has actual knowledge of discrimination . . . and fails adequately to respond. We think, moreover, 
that the response must amount to deliberate indifference to discrimination.”); see also Simpson 
v. Univ. of Colo., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Colo. 2005) (granting summary judgment for the 
defendant university in a claim for money damages and injunctive relief brought by two students 
who alleged being sexually assaulted by the members and recruits of the university’s football 
team), rev’d, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 
(10th Cir. 2007) (reversing the lower court’s grant of summary judgment based in part upon the 
deliberate-indifference theory). 
 49. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
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rigorous institutional mechanisms to avoid liability, colleges and 
universities are confronted with Title IX sexual-assault litigation 
somewhat regularly.50 Therefore, the risk of liability for educational 
institutions is real. This risk encourages institutions to be vigilant, and 
potentially even overly zealous, in adjudicating accusations of sexual 
assault.51 
2. Due Process: Constitutional and Contractual Protections for the 
Accused.  Although Title IX creates an incentive for institutions to act 
expeditiously in response to accusations of sexual assault, due-process 
concerns provide an equally important incentive for institutions to 
take a deliberate and careful approach to addressing such matters. 
Due process is a foundational component of the American legal 
system, ensuring that accused individuals are able to take full 
advantage of the crucible of litigation before they are held 
responsible for a crime or impropriety.52 In the criminal-justice 
system, due-process rights provide a vast shield of protective 
affirmative rights and presumptions. Some notable examples of 
affirmative rights include the rights to consult counsel, to be tried by a 
 
 50. See, e.g., Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1173 (permitting female university students to proceed in 
their Title IX claims); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (permitting a rape victim’s Title IX suit for damages against her former university to 
proceed); see also Doe v. Univ. of the Pac., No. CIV. S-09-764 FCD/JKN, 2010 WL 5135360, at 
*18 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010) (granting summary judgment for the defendant university in a 
lawsuit brought by a female student, an assault victim who alleged that the university violated 
Title IX and created a hostile environment, even though it employed various tools to protect her 
interests). 
 51. In addition, the implications of Title IX liability are substantial and may extend beyond 
the courtroom. In Williams v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 477 F.3d 
1282 (11th Cir. 2007), a female student alleged that the institution had violated Title IX by 
failing to respond adequately to her report that she was gang raped by three student athletes, id. 
at 1288–90. The Eleventh Circuit held that the victim had presented an actionable complaint 
when she demonstrated that the institution recruited the ringleader of the assault with 
knowledge of his history of sexual violence, failed to supervise the ringleader properly while he 
was living in student-housing facilities, waited approximately eleven months after the event to 
conduct a disciplinary hearing, and failed to take precautions that would prevent future attacks. 
Id. at 1296–97. The suit received significant press coverage, which depicted the university in a 
negative light, and contributed to the early termination of the university’s men’s basketball 
season in 2003. Appeals Court Partly Revives Sex-Harassment Claim Against U. of Georgia, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 12, 2007), http://chronicle.com/article/Appeals-Court-Partly-
Revive/38209. 
 52. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (“As early as Magna Carta, 
procedure was regarded as a valuable means for the protection of the rights of litigants. . . . Few 
principles of law, applicable as well to the administrative process, are as fundamental or well 
established . . . .”). 
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jury of one’s peers, to subpoena witnesses, and to cross-examine 
witnesses.53 Individuals accused of crimes also benefit from a 
presumption of innocence and the highest standard of proof in the 
American legal system, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.54 In 
the higher-education context, however, students have never been 
afforded such expansive rights.55 In fact, the Supreme Court squarely 
held that students have no constitutionally protected substantive due-
process rights to their education.56 Instead, courts have recognized 
that college students at public universities possess only limited 
procedural due-process rights.57 Students at private institutions, on the 
other hand, are protected by the Constitution only when procedures 
are fundamentally unfair.58 Otherwise, due-process rights exist only in 
the institution’s student handbook provisions, which are enforceable 
through breach-of-contract claims.59 Because courts have defined due 
process differently for public- and private-school students, this Note 
discusses those rights separately. 
a. Due-Process Rights for Public-School Students.  Students 
enrolled at public colleges and universities have constitutionally 
protected due-process rights, although courts disagree as to the exact 
parameters of those rights. The first case to recognize that a public-
college student should be afforded procedural due-process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment was Dixon v. Alabama State 
 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 54. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979) (“In the administration of criminal 
justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by 
requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of the accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Valente v. Univ. of Dayton Sch. of Law, No. 3:07-cv-473, 2008 WL 343112 
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 2008) (rejecting the plaintiff’s desired due-process requirements for an 
honor-code proceeding, such as a voir dire process and the right to a unanimous jury finding, 
and explaining that such rights were unique to the criminal context). 
 56. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of 
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor 
do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). 
 57. See Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1961) (noting that 
public universities cannot arbitrarily take action that would negatively impact the private 
interests of students and instead must have clear processes and procedures). 
 58. See Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (“The 
only caveat applied to this principle [that students at private institutions are protected by 
contractual provisions] is that the disciplinary procedures established by the institution must be 
fundamentally fair.”). 
 59. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. This Note refers to such claims as 
“contractual due-process claims.” 
TRIPLETT IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012  2:10 PM 
2012] DUE PROCESS IN CAMPUS ADJUDICATIONS 499 
Board of Education,60 in which students alleged that their due-process 
rights had been violated when they were expelled without a hearing 
from Alabama State College after participating in civil-rights 
protests.61 The Fifth Circuit held that even though the Constitution 
does not afford any substantive right to an education, “it nonetheless 
remains true that the State cannot condition the granting of even a 
privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to 
procedural due process.”62 Accordingly, Dixon held that public-
college students had private interests at stake in remaining enrolled at 
the public university of their choice and therefore were entitled to 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when those interests 
were in jeopardy.63 Since Dixon, courts have accepted that public-
college students should be afforded due-process protections in serious 
disciplinary hearings.64 In fact, in Goss v. Lopez,65 the Supreme Court 
 
 60. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 61. Id. at 150–55. 
 62. Id. at 156. The court elaborated: 
  It is not enough to say, as did the district court in the present case, “The right to 
attend a public college or university is not in and of itself a constitutional right.” That 
argument was emphatically answered by the Supreme Court in [Cafeteria and 
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)], when it said 
that the question of whether “ . . . summarily denying [plaintiff] access to the site of 
her former employment violated the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment . . . cannot be answered by easy assertion that, because she had no 
constitutional right to be there in the first place, she was not deprived of liberty or 
property by the Superintendent’s action. ‘One may not have a constitutional right to 
go to Bagdad, but the Government may not prohibit one from going there unless by 
means consonant with due process of law.’” 
Dixon, 294 F.2d at 156 (second and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Ala. 1960), rev’d, 294 F.2d 150 
(5th Cir. 1961); and Cafeteria Workers, 367 U.S. at 894). 
 63. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 156–57. 
 64. Courts, including the Supreme Court, have viewed Dixon as establishing that students 
enrolled at public institutions of higher education have constitutionally protected procedural 
due-process rights that must be observed before they may be suspended or expelled. See, e.g., 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975) (“Since the landmark decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, the lower federal 
courts have uniformly held the Due Process Clause applicable to decisions made by tax-
supported educational institutions to remove a student from the institution long enough for the 
removal to be classified as an expulsion.” (citations omitted)); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 
7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[A] student facing expulsion or suspension from a public educational 
institution is entitled to the protections of due process.” (citing Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157)); Nash v. 
Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1987) (“In Dixon v. Alabama State Board of 
Education, we broadly defined the notice and hearing required in cases of student expulsion 
from college . . . .” (citations omitted)). In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), however, the 
Supreme Court held that public elementary-school students facing suspensions of ten days were 
entitled to procedural due-process protections because the state of Ohio had statutorily granted 
a right to such education, id. at 573–74. Therefore, the Court relied on the fact that the state had 
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hailed Dixon as a “landmark” decision and used Dixon’s reasoning to 
support the Court’s conclusion that public elementary-school students 
have due-process rights in certain circumstances.66 Modern courts 
have refined the Dixon reasoning to hold that students’ procedural 
due-process rights arise from liberty interests in their reputations and 
academic good standing.67 
Although courts have consistently observed that procedural due-
process rights exist for public-college students who have been accused 
of serious infractions, they have been less consistent on the scope of 
those due-process rights.68 Instead, courts prefer ex post, case-by-case 
determinations of the rights to which students are entitled.69 Such an 
approach is characteristic of the American judicial system generally, 
but educational institutions—who owe fiduciary and contractual 
obligations to all their students, including the accused and the 
 
granted a right, rather than a privilege, as the basis for holding that such a right deserved due-
process protections. Id. Notwithstanding this important distinction, since Dixon and Goss, 
courts have been comfortable with the premise that students at public colleges are generally 
entitled to due process in disciplinary procedures. See, e.g., Terrell v. Del. State Univ., No. 09-
464 (GMS), 2010 WL 2952221, at *4 (D. Del. 2010) (discussing both Goss and Dixon as the basis 
of procedural due process for accused students in college adjudicatory settings); Jaksa v. 
Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1247–49 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (same); Donohue v. 
Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 145 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing Goss and explaining that public-
college students are entitled to procedural due-process protections). 
 65. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 66. Id. at 576 n.8. The Court drew an important distinction three years later, however, in 
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). There, the 
Court explained that “[t]he need for flexibility is well illustrated by the significant difference 
between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and the violation by a student of 
valid rules of conduct. This difference calls for far less stringent procedural requirements in the 
case of an academic dismissal.” Id. at 86. Therefore, “because the academic process is not 
adversarial, dismissals for academic reasons do not require a formal notice and hearing.” Furey 
v. Temple Univ., 730 F. Supp. 2d 380, 393 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86). 
 67. See, e.g., Danso v. Univ. of Conn., 919 A.2d 1100, 1106 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (“It is 
doubtful that a college student attending a state university has a valid property interest in 
staying in school. . . . [H]owever, [such] a student . . . has a liberty interest in continuing that 
education.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due 
process applies, the question remains what process is due.”). 
 69. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 577–78 (“We turn to that question [of what process is due], fully 
realizing as our cases regularly do that the interpretation and application of the Due Process 
Clause are intensely practical matters and that ‘[t]he very nature of due process negates any 
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable . . . .’” (first alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961))). 
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victim70—need further guidance to be equipped to act ex ante, before 
the interests of either party have been compromised. 
The need for more specific guidance is exposed by comparing 
similar cases from different courts. For example, in Donohue v. 
Baker,71 the court held that the accused had a right to cross-examine 
his accuser in a campus adjudication, particularly because the “case 
[was] one of credibility” dealing with his testimony against that of an 
alleged sexual-assault victim.72 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
acknowledged that the interests in protecting the victim from 
embarrassment and further harassment were substantial but reasoned 
that such concerns were outweighed by the accused student’s right to 
confront his accuser.73 
Donohue stands as an outlier, however, and most other courts 
have held that students in disciplinary hearings have no right to cross-
examination.74 A Connecticut state court held that a student who was 
accused of sexually intimidating a classmate was not denied due 
process when he was prevented from cross-examining the alleged 
victim.75 Similarly, another court explained that “the right to 
unlimited cross-examination has not been deemed an essential 
requirement of due process.”76 Despite the fact that the weight of 
authority is against the right of cross-examination, educational 
 
 70. See ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 155–57 (explaining that the 
student-university legal relationship has been interpreted using five different frameworks, 
including that of a contractual relationship and a fiduciary relationship); see also Alvin L. 
Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students—A Fiduciary Theory, 54 KY. L.J. 643, 
674 (1966) (“[T]he university, like any fiduciary, . . . should have the burden of demonstrating 
that any disciplinary action: (a) was reasonably imposed for cause consistent with its function of 
maintaining an open-minded atmosphere . . . for freely inquiring into and exploring ideas; and 
(b) was imposed in a manner consistent with scholarly integrity and process.”). 
 71. Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 72. Id. at 145–47. 
 73. See id. at 147 (“Regardless of how ‘sensitive’ the proceeding was deemed to be, the 
defendants remained bound to observe the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Thomas R. Baker, Cross-Examination of Witnesses in College Student 
Disciplinary Hearings: A New York Case Rekindles an Old Controversy, 142 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 
11 (2000) (“Prior to 1997, no federal judge had reinstated a post-secondary student . . . solely 
because the university[] . . . did not permit the student to cross-examine witnesses.”). 
 75. Danso v. Univ. of Conn., 919 A.2d 1100, 1108 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (“Due 
process . . . does not require that a student . . . be afforded a right to cross-examine 
witnesses . . . .”). 
 76. Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that unspecified 
limitations on an accused student’s ability to conduct cross-examination were insufficient to 
create due-process concerns, in part because the ability to conduct expansive cross-examination 
has not been deemed a right for accused students). 
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administrators still fear that they may be held liable if the Donohue 
reasoning spreads to other jurisdictions.77 
Courts also disagree about whether due process requires that 
students have access to legal counsel. For instance, in Donohue, the 
court found no due-process violation when the accused student was 
denied access to nonstudent legal counsel.78 Likewise, in Danso v. 
University of Connecticut,79 a student’s due-process rights were not 
infringed when he was denied access to the student advocate of his 
choice.80 By contrast, in Furey v. Temple University,81 the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania held that a student who was facing expulsion 
should have been granted access to legal counsel.82 
As these cases demonstrate, the judicial approach to defining 
due-process rights for public-college students has been inconsistent. 
Moreover, courts have not addressed some pressing questions about 
due-process rights, such as whether the accused has the right to 
subpoena witnesses or compel discovery. Greater certainty is needed. 
b. Due-Process Rights for Private-School Students.  Courts have 
declined to extend the reasoning of Dixon to private universities and, 
as a result, students at private institutions face even greater variability 
in terms of their due-process rights.83 Because students at such 
institutions lack constitutional due-process rights, they must derive 
any due-process rights from state contract law as it relates to student 
disciplinary policies and from other agreements between the student 
and the institution.84 The only way in which the Constitution could be 
 
 77. See Baker, supra note 74, at 11 (“Although only a district court ruling, the significance 
of Donohue for practitioners was considerable.”). 
 78. Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 146. 
 79. Danso v. Univ. of Conn., 919 A.2d 1100 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 80. Id. at 1110. 
 81. Furey v. Temple Univ., 730 F. Supp. 2d 380 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 82. Id. at 397–98. 
 83. In fact, Dixon explained that “the well-settled rule that the relations between a student 
and a private university are a matter of contract.” Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 
(5th Cir. 1961); see also, Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1991) (“In the university context due process is defined according to whether the institution is 
public or private. . . . The law . . . at private [institutions] . . . is not so well settled. . . . [S]tudents 
who are being disciplined are entitled only to those procedural safeguards which the school 
specifically provides.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary 
Med., 573 A.2d 575, 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990))). 
 84. See, e.g., Cloud v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 724 (1st Cir. 1983) (“Since [the 
student’s] claim is based on his contract with the university, [state] law governs . . . .”); 
Goodman v. President & Trs. of Bowdoin Coll., 135 F. Supp. 2d 40, 45 (D. Me. 2001) (“Plaintiff 
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implicated is if the student can show that the institution’s procedures 
were not “fundamentally fair.”85 
Therefore, private-college students are less protected than their 
public-school peers. For example, in Cloud v. Trustees of Boston 
University,86 the court emphasized that 
“[i]f school officials act in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds . . . their decision to suspend or expel a student will not be 
subject to successful challenge in the courts.” This deferential 
standard of review applies when . . . there is no contractual right to a 
hearing. Where, as here, the university specifically provides for a 
disciplinary hearing before expulsion, [the court] review[s] the 
procedures followed to ensure that they fall within the range of 
reasonable expectations . . . . [The court] also examine[s] the hearing 
to ensure that it was conducted with basic fairness.87 
Under this deferential standard, the court found no contractual due-
process violations, even though the student’s ability to cross-examine 
witnesses had been curtailed by one witness who had refused to state 
her identity, the student’s past criminal proceedings had been 
introduced as prejudicial character evidence, the university had failed 
to produce relevant employee witnesses, and the committee was 
possibly biased.88 The court made its determination even though the 
relevant student handbook provisions stated that students who faced 
disciplinary action by the institution would be provided “the right to 
have the case decided by an impartial judicial body,” “the right to 
confront and cross examine any witness,” and “the right to call 
witnesses and introduce evidence.”89 
Likewise, in Jansen v. Emory University,90 a court was unwilling 
to engage in a substantive analysis of the student’s contractual due-
process claims and instead summarily rejected the claims as falling 
outside the realm of the court’s expertise. The court reasoned that 
institutions should be afforded autonomy in adjudicating academic 
infractions—as opposed to disciplinary infractions, which trigger only 
 
alleges breach of contract against Defendant Bowdoin College on the grounds that the college 
breached the promises set forth in its Student Handbook . . . .”). 
 85. Psi Upsilon, 591 A.2d at 758. 
 86. Cloud v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 720 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 87. Id. at 724–25 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Coveney v. President & 
Trs. of Holy Cross Coll., 445 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Mass. 1983)). 
 88. Id. at 723–26. 
 89. Id. at 723 (quoting the student handbook). 
 90. Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
TRIPLETT IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012  2:10 PM 
504 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:487 
limited judicial oversight.91 Although the Supreme Court has 
supported the distinction between academic and disciplinary matters 
for due-process purposes,92 in Jansen the student’s poor academic 
record resulted from two failing grades that were administered for 
purely disciplinary reasons.93 Nevertheless, the court refused to 
substantively examine the student’s contract claims.94 
Even when courts have recognized contractual due-process 
causes of action, the results have been inconsistent. For example, the 
Eighth Circuit in Corso v. Creighton University,95 facing facts nearly 
identical to Jansen, reached an opposite conclusion. In Corso, the 
court declined to give deference to an institution’s adjudication of 
academic infractions and instead found that the institution had 
breached its contractual promise of due process.96 Thus, in the due-
 
 91. Id. at 1063 (“Courts . . . should not lightly undercut the ‘compelling need and very 
strong policy consideration in favor of giving . . . school officials the widest possible latitude in 
the management of school affairs.’ Plaintiff is correct in observing that the traditional rule of 
nonintervention in academic matters does not apply to review of disciplinary actions by 
educational institutions. . . . The mere fact that some of his grades were based on Honor Council 
violations does not render suspect or reviewable the decision of the faculty [to dismiss him from 
the program].” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Keys v. Sawyer, 353 
F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1973))). Jansen involved a dental student at Emory University who 
was dismissed from the program for poor academic performance after he received two failing 
grades for disciplinary problems. Id. at 1061, 1063. Despite a provision in the student handbook 
that provided that “no student will be dismissed without due process,” the student was 
dismissed at a faculty meeting to which the student was not invited. Id. at 1062. 
 92. See supra note 66. 
 93. Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1061, 1063. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 96. Id. at 533. In both Jansen and Corso, students faced sanctions for cheating. In Jansen, 
the court refused to address the student’s due-process concerns because it viewed the sanctions 
as “academic” rather than “disciplinary.” Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1063. But in Corso, the court 
found the institution liable, implicitly refusing to apply the distinction between academic and 
disciplinary matters. Corso, 731 F.2d at 533. Numerous other examples of such inconsistencies 
exist. For example, compare the approach to contractual interpretation in Psi Upsilon of 
Philadelphia v. University of Pennsylvania, 591 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), with Goodman v. 
President and Trustees of Bowdoin College, 135 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D. Me. 2001). In Psi Upsilon, the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that a fraternity’s contract with the university, in which the 
fraternity agreed “[t]o accept collective responsibility for the activities of the individual 
members,” was neither overbroad nor vague. Psi Upsilon, 591 A.2d at 759 (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting university policies and procedures). In Goodman, however, the court was more willing 
to engage in loose contractual interpretation. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he had been 
denied contractual due-process rights when he was prevented from obtaining access to medical 
records and contacting a witness to an alleged fight. Goodman, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 44. The 
student handbook stated that the institution reserved “the right to make changes 
in . . . procedures, and charges,” but the court limited this provision and prevented a change in 
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process context, courts have been inconsistent, with variations 
existing from court to court.97 Likewise, as students move from the 
public- to the private-school context, their constitutional due-process 
rights change dramatically. This lack of consistency between courts 
and across the public- and private-school divide is concerning. 
3. FERPA: Mandated Limits on Available Information.  
Although FERPA is not a primary regulator of student sexual-assault 
proceedings, it does complicate sexual-assault proceedings by 
curtailing the amount of information that can be made available in 
the adjudicatory process. The law protects as confidential any 
document that is classified as an “education record[].”98 This phrase 
has a broad and general definition and includes “information directly 
related to a student” that is “maintained by an educational agency or 
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.”99 In 
sexual-assault cases, highly pertinent information relating to the 
events in question or to one party’s past may be protected. Although 
the statute provides some limited exceptions to allow for disclosure, 
no such exception exists for campus adjudicatory proceedings.100 
Therefore, as the Dear Colleague Letter acknowledges, FERPA 
curtails the amount of information available in campus adjudicatory 
hearings.101 In fact, educators have long expressed confusion about 
how the law should operate in sexual-assault proceedings.102 For 
related reasons, commentators have criticized the law for stymieing 
campus-safety efforts.103 
 
policy during the procedures. Id. at 57 (quoting Bowdoin’s 1998-1999 Student Handbook) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97.  See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
 98. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a) (2006); see also Katrina Chapman, Note, A Preventable Tragedy at 
Virginia Tech: Why Confusion over FERPA’s Provisions Prevents Schools from Addressing 
Student Violence, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 349, 353–54 (2009) (“FERPA requires that student 
records be kept confidential. It provides access . . . only with the consent of parents . . . .”). 
 99. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(1). 
 100. Id. § 1232g(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 101. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 11 n.29. 
 102. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR 
THIRD PARTIES, at vi–vii (2001), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
shguide.pdf (“[C]ommenters raised concerns about the interrelation of [FERPA] and Title IX. 
The concerns relate to two issues: (1) the harassed student’s right to information about the 
outcome of a sexual harassment complaint and (2) the due process rights of 
individuals . . . accused of sexual harassment . . . .”). 
 103. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 98, at 352 (“FERPA still does not adequately define 
when an emergency exists . . . .”); Stephanie Humphries, Note, Institutions of Higher Education, 
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C. Cause for Confusion 
Faced with these competing legal considerations, college and 
university administrators struggle to balance their obligations to 
victims of sexual assault with their corresponding duties to provide 
due-process protections to accused students. Title IX creates a firm 
obligation for institutions to respond vigilantly to reports of assault.104 
But courts enforcing due-process rights—enforceable under either 
constitutional or contract law—mandate that institutions provide 
some level of process, though these institutions have received limited 
and contradictory guidance about what process is actually due. This 
uncertainty and variability produces a liability trap for educators who 
are unsure of how to proceed.105 FERPA further complicates matters 
by restricting the information that can be considered in sexual-assault 
proceedings.106 As a result, students are subjected to fundamentally 
different processes depending on the institution they attend.107 In 
response to this inconsistency, the OCR published its Dear Colleague 
Letter. 
 
Safety Swords, and Privacy Shields: Reconciling FERPA and the Common Law, 35 J.C. & U.L. 
145, 149 (2008) (“[B]oth FERPA and the common law contain internal tensions regarding safety 
and privacy that neither Congress nor the courts have adequately reconciled . . . .”). 
 104. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 105. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of the South, No. 4:09-cv-62, 2011 WL 1258104, at *22 (E.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 31, 2011) (allowing a student’s breach-of-contract claim to proceed under the theory 
that the university deprived him of due process). The jury eventually awarded the student over 
$20,000 in compensatory damages. Collin Eaton, Jury Verdict in Sex-Assault Case at Sewanee 
Sends Warning to Private Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 2, 2011), http://
chronicle.com/article/Jury-Verdict-in-Sex-Assault/128884; see also Williams v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1294–99 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that an adequate Title IX 
claim had been mounted against the University of Georgia by a former student and rape 
victim). 
 106. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 107. For example, the standard of proof in student disciplinary hearings has historically 
varied wildly across institutions. Compare Margaret Fosmoe, ND To Change Sex Assault 
Response, SOUTH BEND TRIB., July 2, 2011, at A1 (“Notre Dame agreed to make clear that it 
will use a ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard to evaluate sexual harassment allegations.”), 
with Rebecca D. Robbins, Harvard Will Not Alter Its Sexual Assault Policies in Response to 
Yale, HARVARD CRIMSON (June 27, 2012), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2012/6/27/sexual-
assault-no-response (detailing differing standards of proof at different Harvard schools), and 
Davis, supra note 8 (explaining that the University of Virginia altered “its policy from one of 
‘clear and convincing evidence’” to a preponderance standard). 
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II.  THE DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 
The April 4, 2011, Dear Colleague Letter, released amid much 
fanfare,108 frames its guidance by emphasizing the OCR’s concern with 
high rates of sexual violence on school campuses.109 It then proceeds 
to discuss the obligations of schools receiving federal funds to 
respond to such violence, particularly focusing on procedural 
requirements.110 The letter concludes with recommendations for 
preventing assault.111 
As a guidance document, the Dear Colleague Letter effectively 
conveys the OCR’s expectations. It builds on the OCR’s earlier 
guidelines112 by focusing almost exclusively on the victim’s interests113 
and articulates at least five substantive points that raise due-process 
concerns for the accused.114 Ultimately, the letter fails to address this 
key underlying issue: how Title IX should interact with applicable 
due-process requirements for the accused. 
A. Analyzing the Dear Colleague Letter’s Substantive Points 
First, and perhaps most controversially, the Dear Colleague 
Letter recommends a specific standard of proof for judicial 
 
 108. In fact, Vice President Joseph Biden and Education Secretary Arne Duncan took the 
unusual step of publically announcing the Dear Colleague Letter’s release at a media event at 
the University of New Hampshire. Lauren Sieben, Education Dept. Issues New Guidance for 
Sexual-Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 4, 2011, at A20. The Dear 
Colleague Letter’s author, DOE Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn Ali, described 
the letter as “historic,” emphasizing that it is not an attempt to alter the law, but rather serves as 
a “clarification” of existing law. Allie Grasgreen, Call to Action on Sexual Harassment, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Apr. 4, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/04/04/
education_department_civil_rights_office_clarifies_colleges_sexual_harassment_obligations_titl
e_ix (quoting Ali) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 1–3. 
 110. Id. at 3–14. 
 111. Id. at 14–19. 
 112. See id. at 2 (“This letter supplements the 2001 Guidance,[ OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 
supra note 102,] by providing additional guidance . . . regarding the Title IX requirements as 
they relate to sexual violence.”); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 102, at 1 (“[W]e 
intend th[is] revised guidance to serve the same purpose as the 1997 guidance. It continues to 
provide the principles that a school should use to recognize and effectively respond to sexual 
harassment of students in its program as a condition of receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 113. This is not to suggest that the OCR should not be concerned with protecting victims of 
assault. Rather, the OCR should more effectively address both students’ interests. For 
institutions to be able to provide maximum protections against peer sexual assault, institutions 
must first know the limits of due-process requirements. Therefore, the OCR should provide 
more guidance as a means of enabling institutions to fully comply with Title IX. 
 114. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 8–14. 
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proceedings involving accusations of peer sexual assault.115 The letter 
prescribes a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, noting that 
“[t]he ‘clear and convincing’ standard . . . currently used by some 
schools, is a higher [and improper] standard of proof.”116 It goes on to 
explain that campus adjudicatory proceedings are wholly distinct 
from criminal proceedings and that neither proceeding’s outcome 
should affect the other.117 This standard-of-proof portion of the Dear 
Colleague Letter has engendered the most criticism from 
commentators.118 DOE Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn 
Ali has noted that, notwithstanding this vociferous criticism, this 
portion of the Dear Colleague Letter is critically important.119 
Referencing the clear-and-convincing standard of proof, she has 
elaborated that “[t]he guidance answers a longstanding question that 
we have heard from many general counsels about, and that is what 
the standard of proof is. . . . Far too often universities use that higher 
standard when it comes to Title IX.”120 
Second, the Dear Colleague Letter outlines a discovery process 
that is curtailed by FERPA.121 Although both the alleged victim and 
perpetrator must have “similar and timely access to any information 
that will be used at the [judicial] hearing,” this access is severely 
limited in situations in which FERPA mandates a right to privacy.122 
The Dear Colleague Letter does not detail the specific FERPA 
provisions that are triggered during the institution’s judicial process, 
but it does note that “the alleged perpetrator should not be given 
access to communications between the complainant and a counselor 
or information regarding the complainant’s sexual history.”123 After 
the institution’s judicial process concludes, FERPA is triggered again 
 
 115. Id. at 11. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 10. 
 118. See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 9 (“Most egregiously, OCR requires universities to 
render judgment using ‘a preponderance of the evidence’ standard.”). But see Stacy Malone, 
Victim Rights Law Center Responds to Wall Street Journal Editorial, VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR. 
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.victimrights.org/sexual-assault-happens-college-campuses-stop-
blaming-victims-and-hold-perpetrators-accountable (“Mr. Berkowitz . . . confuses the civil and 
criminal laws when he criticizes the burden of proof . . . .”). 
 119. See Grasgreen, supra note 108 (“In the press call, Ali stressed the importance of 
clarifying the standard of proof for sexual harassment.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 13. 
 122. Id. at 11 & n.29. 
 123. Id. at 11 n.29. 
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and shapes the way in which the institution may handle an 
announcement of guilt or innocence.124 The institution may inform the 
victim of the result of the hearing and any subsequent sanctions or 
penalties against the perpetrator and may also disclose this 
information to the general public.125 But according to the OCR, 
FERPA prohibits the institution from disclosing any other 
information relating to the student’s education record, such as 
whether the student was punished for conduct not relating to the 
harassed student.126 
The Dear Colleague Letter also addresses privacy issues from 
the victim’s perspective.127 Before an investigation can begin, the 
complainant must consent.128 In addition, the complainant retains the 
power to request confidentiality, in which case the institution must 
take appropriate steps to prevent the accused from learning of the 
accuser’s identity.129 In the presence of certain factors, however, the 
institution may be entitled to disclose the victim’s identity.130 The 
institution must weigh the complainant’s request for confidentiality 
against “the seriousness of the alleged harassment; the complainant’s 
age; whether there have been other harassment complaints about the 
same individual; and the alleged harasser’s rights to receive 
information about the allegations if the information is maintained by 
the school as an ‘education record’ under [FERPA].”131 
Third, the Dear Colleague Letter gives the institution complete 
discretion to determine whether the parties are permitted to have 
counsel.132 The letter takes no position on whether counsel should or 
should not be allowed but notes that both parties must be treated 
equally in this regard.133 Fourth, the letter takes a strong position on 
the question of cross-examination, noting that “OCR strongly 
discourages schools from allowing the parties personally to question 
 
 124. Id. at 13–14. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 13. 
 127. Id. at 5. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 132. Id. at 12. 
 133. Id. 
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or cross-examine each other.”134 Fifth, the Dear Colleague Letter 
mandates that an appeals process be made available to both parties.135 
In addition to these substantive points, the Dear Colleague 
Letter clarifies other important issues to help institutions better 
recognize and prevent prohibited conduct. For instance, it defines 
sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature,” which 
“includes sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”136 
Finally, although the letter focuses almost exclusively on the 
interests of the victim, it contains two important sentences that 
discuss the rights of the accused. Specifically, “[p]ublic and state-
sponsored schools must provide due process to the alleged 
perpetrator. However, schools should ensure that steps taken to 
accord due-process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not restrict or 
unnecessarily delay the Title IX protections for the complainant.”137 
B. Unaddressed Questions 
Despite the Dear Colleague Letter’s specific guidance, it fails to 
address fundamental questions about how the complex web of higher-
education regulations pertaining to sexual assault and due process 
should interact to form one seamless umbrella of guidelines. Instead, 
tension remains between the requirements of Title IX, 
constitutionally and contractually mandated due process, and the 
rules of confidentiality and disclosure under FERPA. For example, 
an institution trying to comply simultaneously with Donohue and the 
Dear Colleague Letter might reach an impasse because Donohue 
requires cross-examination as a matter of right in cases where the 
main issue is witness credibility,138 whereas the letter cautions against 
the practice. Perhaps more worrisome, however, is the reality that 
wide variance continues to exist across institutions and among sexual-
assault adjudication policies.139 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 3. 
 137. Id. at 12. 
 138. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 139. For example, despite the consistency advocated by the OCR’s insistence on a uniform 
standard of proof, some institutions are refusing to follow suit. E.g., Robbins, supra note 107. 
Other variations also persist. For instance, Davidson College dispatches an independent, neutral 
investigator to conduct an initial investigation of all claims of assault, Disciplinary Procedures, 
supra note 19, while the University of California at Berkeley employs no such preliminary 
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III.  MOVING FORWARD: CONFRONTING THE NEED FOR CLARITY 
To resolve the continued uncertainty, the OCR should issue 
further guidance in the form of a model judicial policy that must be 
adopted by institutions and implemented uniformly. Such a document 
would ensure consistency and enable institutions to balance more 
appropriately the competing interests of protecting victims of sexual 
assault while also providing adequate due process for the accused. 
Admittedly, the OCR is tasked with enforcing Title IX,140 not with 
ensuring that students accused of sexual assault are provided 
appropriate due process. But because public institutions must also 
ensure that students’ due-process rights are constitutionally 
protected, Title IX must operate within constitutional limits and may 
not mandate a more expeditious proceeding than the Constitution 
would require.141 Without affirmative guidance on how to balance 
these competing obligations, the OCR’s views on Title IX will remain 
ineffectual, thereby endangering victims, increasing the probability of 
liability on the part of the institution for denial of due process, and 
jeopardizing the accused student’s due-process rights.142 
In the spirit of this recommendation, the remainder of this Note 
advocates for the adoption of specific due-process provisions that 
should be incorporated by institutions of higher education. 
Admittedly, these recommendations are framed in constitutional due-
process principles and are, therefore, more applicable to public 
institutions. In the interest of uniformity, however, both public and 
private institutions should embrace these suggestions. The Note 
begins in Section A by outlining the relevant interests at stake and 
explaining why campus sexual assault requires its own, particularized 
due-process standard. Section B offers recommendations regarding 
 
investigations and merely directs an initial meeting with the accused to discuss the charges, see 
Overview of Process, supra note 19. 
 140. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) (2012) (“If the Assistant Secretary [for Civil Rights] finds that 
a recipient has discriminated against persons on the basis of sex in an education program or 
activity, such recipient shall take such remedial action as the Assistant Secretary deems 
necessary to overcome the effects of such discrimination.”). 
 141. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 12 (“Public and state-sponsored schools 
must provide due process to the alleged perpetrator.”); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 
n.8 (1975) (explaining that, since Dixon, due process is required before a student may be 
disciplined by a public-education institution). 
 142. Although empowering the OCR to craft a model policy would admittedly increase the 
DOE’s role, such a role is warranted due to the interest of balancing due process with victim 
protection and the need for greater consistency and clarity. 
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the standard of proof, cross-examination, discovery, and access to 
counsel. 
A. Peer Sexual Assault Is a Distinct Circumstance That Warrants 
Specialized Due-Process Protections 
Before devising an approach to campus sexual assault that 
incorporates both Title IX and procedural due-process requirements, 
understanding the particular interests at stake in the context of peer 
sexual assault is important. These interests should trigger a specific 
and limited standard that is applied only in this special context. The 
need for such special treatment is demonstrated by applying the 
Supreme Court’s precedent for determining applicable due-process 
requirements.143 In Mathews v. Eldridge,144 the Court directed lower 
courts to weigh three factors when determining the proper scope of 
constitutionally protected due-process rights in a particular situation 
or context: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [state] interest, 
including the function involved and fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.145 
This Section analyzes each of these factors in the context of 
sexual-assault campus adjudicatory proceedings. First, accused 
students have liberty interests in preserving their good names and 
reputations.146 This interest in protecting one’s reputation from false 
accusations and preserving one’s unblemished scholastic record is 
vitally important, particularly in the modern era, because false 
accusations can have lasting implications. In fact, compared to the 
effects of other types of infractions such as academic dishonesty, the 
implications of being found responsible for sexual assault by a judicial 
panel can endure throughout one’s lifetime. Some of the more 
 
 143. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (involving a dispute regarding the 
constitutionality of administrative proceedings under the Due Process Clause). 
 144. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 145. Id. at 335. 
 146. Danso v. Univ. of Conn., 919 A.2d 1100, 1106 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). 
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extreme cases, including the Duke lacrosse scandal147 and the 
University of the Pacific gang-rape case,148 demonstrate how college 
sexual-assault proceedings have resonance with the national media. 
Although not every sexual-assault case will garner such far-reaching 
publicity, many offenses do attract local media coverage and can 
provoke significant discussion and controversy among the student 
body.149 
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the accused 
student’s liberty interest is substantial, particularly in the cases in 
which the evidentiary record consists only of the accuser’s testimony. 
In Mathews, the Court distinguished between two types of scenarios: 
those in which the dispute involves competing expert interpretations 
of agreed-upon facts and those in which the facts themselves are in 
question and are subject to the veracity of the witnesses.150 In the 
latter situation, when witness credibility is essential, oral evidence and 
cross-examination are very important because, without such evidence, 
the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty is high.151 Most campus 
sexual-assault cases fall into this area of disputed facts. A verdict will 
often turn on the disciplinary panel’s view of witness credibility, 
rather than on debates between experts. Therefore, the second 
Mathews factor points in favor of providing as much evidentiary 
process as possible so that the disciplinary panel is deciding cases with 
more rather than less evidence before it. 
On the other side of the scale is the third Mathews factor—the 
cost that increased process would impose on the adjudicatory system. 
In Mathews, these costs were divided into two categories: the costs of 
implementing the procedural requirements and the costs of allowing 
the beneficiary of the process to remain in possession of his or her 
 
 147. See, e.g., Byron Calame, Revisiting The Times’s Coverage of the Duke Rape Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, at C12 (analyzing the extensive media scrutiny surrounding the Duke 
lacrosse scandal). 
 148. Doe v. Univ. of the Pac., No. 4:09-cv-62, 2010 WL 5135360 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010); 
see also Eisen, supra note 2 (describing the alleged University of the Pacific gang rape). 
 149. E.g., Georgina Gustin, Rape of Student at Blackburn Rattles Campus, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2004, at B06 (“A sexual assault on the quiet campus of Blackburn College 
in Carlinville last week has rattled students . . . .”); Sexual Assault Workshop, WASH. POST, June 
30, 1991, at D11A (“[The College of William and Mary] was embroiled in controversy this 
school year after a freshman complained she was the victim of date rape.”). 
 150. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343–44. 
 151. Id. at 341. 
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interests until a decision had been reached.152 In the higher-education 
context, both sets of costs may be significant. 
The first group of costs—those of actually implementing the due-
process procedures at the hearing—can be substantial. Courts have 
generally avoided imposing far-reaching due-process burdens in the 
education context for fear that such burdens would detract from the 
educational environment and displace the autonomy of the 
institution’s educational mission.153 Expansive due-process 
requirements are expensive, time-consuming, and generally beyond 
the expertise of the educational context. For example, the right of the 
accused to subpoena witnesses or to conduct discovery might easily 
tax a student-affairs office’s limited resources. More importantly, the 
prospect of an expensive, embarrassing, and prolonged adjudicatory 
process could decrease a victim’s willingness to report incidents of 
assault. This chilling effect is itself a type of cost that is borne by the 
institution, both in the form of an eroded feeling of academic unity on 
campus as well as in the form of potential Title IX liability for 
insufficient protections against assault.154 
Notwithstanding the fact that a full trial-like process would 
impose tangible costs on educational institutions, there are some 
mitigating factors unique to the higher-education context that may 
limit the costs. For example, campus adjudicatory proceedings are 
often at least partially staffed by student members who are not paid 
for their services.155 The use of such student judicial officers does not 
completely eliminate the institutional burden or the potential for 
undue embarrassment for the victim,156 but student participation does 
mitigate the expense of the proceeding. On a more theoretical level, 
 
 152. Id. at 347–48. 
 153. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (“This is 
not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is 
required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college activities, might 
be detrimental to the college’s educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 74, at 23 (“[I]n this setting, the opportunity to cross-
examine the alleged offender is not likely to encourage prospective complainants to undertake 
the personal risks associated with filing a formal complaint, and the traumatic side-effects of 
cross-examination ordinarily impact the alleged victims much more negatively than the alleged 
offenders.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 19 (“The Honor Council is composed of 
thirty students . . . elected at large from the student body.”). 
 156. Indeed, in some instances, the use of student judicial officers may actually exacerbate 
the concern of undue embarrassment for the victim, insofar as students will be hesitant to 
subject themselves to an investigative proceeding in front of their peers and classmates. 
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due process is valued as a part of the broader educational mission of 
the institution. A survey of the mission statements and objectives of 
the top twenty-five colleges and universities in the United States157 
reveals that, with near uniformity, institutions of higher education 
value the quest for knowledge and truth in a complex world.158 
Therefore, the institution itself has often demonstrated a commitment 
to the discovery of truth in all aspects of the educational environment, 
and this mission would be furthered by implementing additional 
process requirements.159 Rather than an ancillary distraction, 
therefore, due process can be viewed as an investment in the 
institution’s core academic mission—a consideration which may 
partially offset the magnitude of the cost. 
The second group of costs—those of allowing the accused 
student to remain enrolled at the institution—can also be significant. 
For an educational institution, sexual-assault scandals are concerning 
for at least two reasons. First, they threaten to subvert the learning 
environment by detracting from the student body’s focus on 
education. Second, they can potentially produce a culture of fear 
among students on campus. Particularly on a residential campus, 
where the institution desires to foster a community in which students 
can feel free to learn and explore, lingering safety concerns can be 
catastrophic to the educational mission. In an effort to address these 
concerns, institutions may incur additional costs. For example, the 
 
 157. For a list of these institutions, as measured in 2012 by the U.S. News and World Report, 
see National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.usnews
.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities (last visited Sept. 25, 
2012). 
 158. See, e.g., Mission Statement, UNIV. OF CAL., http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/
aboutuc/missionstatement.html (last updated Jan. 26, 2004) (“The distinctive mission of the 
University is to serve society as a center of higher learning, providing long-term societal benefits 
through transmitting advanced knowledge, discovering new knowledge, and functioning as an 
active working repository of organized knowledge.” (quoting the 1974–78 University of 
California Academic Plan) (internal quotation mark omitted)); University Mission Statement, 
YALE UNIV., http://www.yale.edu/about/mission.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (“Like all 
great research universities, Yale has a tripartite mission: to create, preserve, and disseminate 
knowledge.”). 
 159. See Goldman, supra note 70, at 674 (“[T]he university, like any fiduciary, . . . should 
have the burden of demonstrating that any disciplinary action: (a) was reasonably imposed for 
cause consistent with its function of maintaining an open-minded atmosphere conducive to the 
acquisition and use of tools for freely inquiring into and exploring ideas; and (b) was imposed in 
a manner consistent with scholarly integrity and process.”). 
TRIPLETT IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012  2:10 PM 
516 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:487 
institution may decide to rearrange the victim’s student’s course 
schedule to avoid any contact with the victim.160 
On balance, these three Mathews factors point toward a special 
due-process standard that applies specifically to peer sexual assault. 
Students who have been accused of sexual assault face serious 
consequences if they are found guilty or even accused of such 
infractions, which, unlike many other types of campus infractions, are 
particularly attention-grabbing and lasting in their implications.161 The 
third Mathews factor, however, requires an important cost-benefit 
analysis that protects institutions from having to provide overly 
burdensome protections. Finally, the dual pressures facing institutions 
are heightened in this context where Title IX and FERPA apply, 
evincing a need for a special approach. Such external pressures simply 
do not apply in other common campus disciplinary matters such as 
academic-honesty violations. 
B. Specific Recommendations: Standard of Proof, Evidentiary Issues, 
and Access to Counsel 
In light of the Mathews calculus, this portion of the Note outlines 
specific due-process protections that should be embraced by 
institutions and the OCR in a model judicial policy. Specifically, this 
Section provides recommendations regarding (1) the standard of 
proof; (2) cross-examination procedures; (3) the discovery process; 
and (4) access to counsel. 
1. A Preponderance Standard of Proof Is Most Appropriate.  The 
most controversial aspect of the Dear Colleague Letter has been its 
recommendation for a new standard of proof in campus adjudicatory 
hearings.162 The OCR’s call for a universal preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard has left many crying foul and accusing the OCR of 
openly targeting male students.163 Notwithstanding this criticism, a 
preponderance standard is appropriate under Mathews and is actually 
not even the most pressing due-process issue implicated by the Dear 
Colleague Letter. 
 
 160. See, e.g., RICE UNIV., Student Handbook—Sexual Assault/Misconduct, http://www
.students.rice.edu/students/sexual_AssaultMisconduct.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (“The 
University will assist students who request assistance in rearranging their classes or living 
arrangement because of an alleged sexual assault.”). 
 161. See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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The OCR justifies its call for a preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard by analogizing to the administrative law context, in which a 
preponderance standard is the norm.164 Putting aside any arguments 
about the persuasiveness of this analogy, a preponderance standard is 
appropriate under Mathews because it is the fairest allocation of 
power in the special context of sexual assault. A preponderance 
standard recognizes that the campus adjudicatory system is distinct 
from the criminal-law context165 and acknowledges that the institution 
has competing obligations to the victim and to the accused.166 As 
between these interests, setting the scale either below or above the 
midline of certainty skews the balance too far in the favor of the 
advantaged party. 
Likewise, the special nature of sexual-assault hearings must be 
kept in mind. In many sexual-assault proceedings, the entire factual 
record will consist of testimony from the alleged victim and the 
alleged assailant.167 In this proverbial “he said, she said” environment, 
the standard of proof should be lower, not higher.168 When combined 
with a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, any standard 
above a preponderance would produce an insurmountable obstacle 
for victims with meritorious claims, thereby implicating Title IX 
liability169 and exposing the institution to added costs. Therefore, a 
preponderance standard is appropriate because it satisfies the first 
two Mathews factors by adequately protecting against wrongful 
findings while also protecting the institution from the costs of Title IX 
liability by not eliminating the possibility of victory for the victim.170 
Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that 
[t]he function of a standard of proof . . . is to “instruct the factfinder 
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should 
 
 164. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 11 n.28. 
 165. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961); Letter from 
Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
 166. ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 155–57. 
 167. Robert Smith, On Sexual Harassment and Title IX, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Aug. 30, 
2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/08/30/on_sexual_harassment_and_title_ix_
111065.html. 
 168. It should be recalled, of course, that this lower standard of proof is appropriate only 
within the institutional disciplinary process. Any criminal proceeding would involve the familiar 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. See supra Part I.A. 
 169. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 145–151 and accompanying text. 
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have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication.” . . . In a criminal case . . . the interests of the 
defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any 
explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by 
standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the 
likelihood of an erroneous judgment.171 
For this reason, the criminal-justice system utilizes the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard.172 A “less commonly used” standard is 
that of clear and convincing evidence,173 which is what many 
institutions employed before the Dear Colleague Letter.174 The Court 
has cautioned, however, that this standard is appropriate only when 
“particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake”175 
such as in “cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-
criminal wrongdoing by the defendant.”176 By contrast, the 
preponderance standard is generally appropriate in the civil context 
because it allows “[t]he litigants [to] share the risk of error in roughly 
equal fashion.”177 
Applying these guidelines to the higher-education context 
demonstrates that a clear-and-convincing or beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard is inappropriate. It should be recalled that, although 
an allegation of sexual assault may have criminal implications, the 
campus adjudicatory proceeding is distinct from that process and does 
not implicate the same liberty interests.178 In the criminal-justice 
system, the accused is entitled to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard,179 but such a standard is inappropriate in the context of 
campus adjudicatory proceedings. Though the interests of the accused 
in not being wrongfully disciplined for sexual misconduct are 
substantial, the Supreme Court has not held that they reach such a 
level as to require a clear-and-convincing standard. For instance, one 
 
 171. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 172. Id. at 424. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See supra notes 8, 107 and accompanying text. 
 175. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 
459 U.S. 375, 389–90 (1983)). 
 176. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. at 423. 
 178. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 179. See, e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009) (explaining in 
the context of a rape case that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent at trial and is entitled 
to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard). 
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of the classic cases in which a clear-and-convincing standard applies is 
in the context of immigration hearings.180 In those situations, the 
interests of the accused in remaining in the United States are 
sufficiently weighty to trigger the clear-and-convincing standard.181 By 
contrast, the interests of a college student in protecting his or her 
good name and remaining enrolled in her or his school of choice do 
not rise to the level of significance of a deportation hearing. Such 
interests, though important, will generally pale in comparison to one’s 
interest in a lawful immigration status. Rather, the accused student’s 
interests are more like those in a hearing for involuntary discharge 
from the military, in which a preponderance standard is used.182 Like 
members of the military who have selected and committed to a 
particular military branch, students have voluntarily enrolled in their 
school of choice and have an interest in remaining at that school and 
in protecting their good name.183 
Finally, the third Mathews factor—that of the administrative 
burden—does not outweigh the need for a preponderance standard. 
Relative to the clear-and-convincing standard that critics of the Dear 
Colleague Letter have advocated,184 a preponderance standard 
imposes fewer burdens upon an institution providing adjudication. 
Moreover, a higher burden might also expose the institution to Title 
IX liability by stifling victims’ abilities to seek institutional remedies, 
thereby imposing additional cost considerations. Therefore, 
institutions should adopt a preponderance standard because that 
standard advances Title IX’s goals without infringing on due process 
for the accused. 
 
 180. See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966) (“To be sure, a deportation 
proceeding is not a criminal prosecution. But it does not syllogistically follow that a person may 
be banished from this country upon no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence 
case. . . . In denaturalization cases the court has required the Government to establish its 
allegations by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.” (citation omitted)); Chaunt v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (“[I]n view of the grave consequences to the citizen, 
naturalization decrees are not lightly to be set aside—the evidence must indeed be ‘clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing . . . .’” (quoting Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 
(1943))). 
 181. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285–86. 
 182. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 68, 78 (1996) (explaining that an 
administrative board employs a preponderance standard in a military-discharge case). 
 183. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra note 9. 
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2. Cross-Examination Should Be Embraced as an Affirmative 
Right of the Accused.  Without any footnotes or citations to legal 
authority, the Dear Colleague Letter states that the “OCR strongly 
discourages schools from allowing the parties personally to question 
or cross-examine each other during the hearing.”185 Whether the OCR 
would deem cross-examination conducted by the accused student’s 
counsel to be more appropriate is unclear. What is clear, however, is 
that this policy potentially places many institutions in a direct conflict 
with their duty to provide due process to the accused.186 As explained 
in Part I, one federal district court has recognized that students in 
disciplinary hearings must be afforded the right to confront their 
accuser.187 Particularly in the context of accusations of sexual assault, 
witness credibility may be the determinative factor; a student’s legal 
defense—and academic and professional future—may turn on the 
ability to cross-examine the accuser.188 For administrators who are 
concerned that other courts might adopt the Donohue reasoning,189 
the OCR’s guidelines pose a direct conflict between competing 
obligations. 
The OCR should amend its views on cross-examination or 
should at least provide a legal basis for its conclusions. Otherwise, 
institutions are left uncertain as to whether they should allow direct 
cross-examination, and a false step in either direction could produce 
liability.190 The preferable approach would be for the OCR to declare 
cross-examination permissible, though most courts that have decided 
this issue have declined to disturb the institution’s discretionary 
decision to allow or disallow cross-examination.191 Much of this 
reluctance has centered on concerns that cross-examination would 
overly burden the campus adjudicatory process192 or affirmatively 
 
 185. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 12. 
 186. See, e.g., Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 139–40 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (“At the very 
least, in light of the disputed nature of the facts and the importance of witness credibility in this 
case, due process required that the panel permit the plaintiff to hear all evidence against him 
and to direct questions to his accuser . . . .”). 
 187. Id. at 146–47; see also supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 188. Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 146–47. 
 189. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 191. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961); Danso v. Univ. of 
Conn., 919 A.2d 1100, 1108 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); Baker, supra note 74, at 13–14 . 
 192. See supra note 153. 
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harm the victim.193 These are weighty concerns, but Mathews requires 
that institutions also consider the accused’s need to meaningfully 
confront the accuser and the charges that have been asserted,194 
factors that will generally outweigh the added time investment 
required to permit cross-examination. 
Moreover, cross-examination can be structured in such a way 
that the victim is protected from embarrassment. In Donohue, for 
instance, the court merely held that the accused student should be 
afforded the opportunity “to direct questions to his accuser through 
the panel.”195 This method of cross-examination would prevent the 
victim from being directly questioned by the accused assailant. 
Institutions have found many creative ways of permitting cross-
examination that enable the accused student to have the opportunity 
to confront the witness, while also protecting the victim from 
suffering psychological harm. For instance, institutions have allowed 
cross-examination to take place through video196 or while the witness 
was shielded from the view of the accused and the accused’s 
counsel.197 Although these methods may increase the administrative 
burden on the institution, thus implicating the third Mathews factor, 
they are already in common use and are an appropriate compromise 
between exposing the victim to unbridled stress and not allowing the 
accused to confront his accuser. 
Further, the unique context of student sexual-assault proceedings 
necessitates the right to cross-examination, which may be the only 
opportunity that the accused student has to make a meaningful 
argument of fact. In analogous contexts, such as in the Administrative 
Procedure Act198 and in hearings for involuntary military discharge, 
 
 193. See Baker, supra note 74, at 23 (“Due to the highly personal nature of a rape charge 
and the emotional toll it exacts on the victim, no procedural design issue generates more 
administrative angst than cross-examination.”). 
 194. See supra notes 150–151 and accompanying text. 
 195. Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis added). It is 
unclear whether OCR’s ban on direct cross-examination, see supra note 134 and accompanying 
text, also prohibits this indirect cross-examination. 
 196. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of the Pac., No. Civ. S-09-764 FCD/KJN, 2010 WL 5135360, at *4 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010) (“As an accommodation to [the victim], the University arranged for 
[her] to provide her testimony to the Board in a building across campus from where [the 
perpetrators] testified.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Cloud v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 720 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1983) (involving a judicial 
hearing in which the witness was shielded from the view of the accused student); Gomes v. 
Univ. of Me. Sys., 304 F. Supp. 2d 117, 129–30 (D. Me. 2004) (involving a hearing in which the 
witness was placed behind a screen and cross-examined out of view). 
 198. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
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both of which implicate similar liberty interests, cross-examination is 
permitted.199 In fact, the Federal Circuit has held that cross-
examination is required in military-discharge proceedings in 
situations that are potentially destructive for the victim.200 
The same factors and considerations as those in military-
discharge hearings are at play in the context of college disciplinary 
hearings for allegations of sexual assault. The institution should have 
some leeway to conduct procedures as it sees fit, but accused students 
must be given the opportunity to cross-examine their accusers 
because in this special context the entire proceeding often turns on 
witness credibility. Further, the testimony of unavailable witnesses 
will often be presented as hearsay evidence,201 which creates an even 
greater interest in allowing the cross-examination of those witnesses 
who are present. By this reasoning, the accused’s interest in avoiding 
wrongful deprivation of rights and the need to uncover the truth—the 
first and second Mathews factors—point toward allowing cross-
examination. Likewise, the ability to utilize innovative cross-
examination methods satisfies the cost concerns captured in the third 
Mathews factor. Accordingly, the OCR should amend its views on 
cross-examination to allow institutions to ensure that adequate due 
process is provided to accused students. 
 
 199. See id. § 556(d) (“A party is entitled to present his case or defense . . . and to conduct 
such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”); infra 
note 200. 
 200. In Doe v. United States, 132 F.3d 1430 (1997), the court reversed the decision of a 
military board to discharge an Air Force officer amid allegations that he had sexually molested 
his daughter, id. at 1437. The evidence against the officer consisted solely of recorded 
statements that his daughter had made to a third party, and the officer was unable to cross-
examine this important witness. Id. at 1435–36. The court noted: 
  Sexual molestation of a child, especially if committed by a child’s own parent, is 
indeed heinous. But like other person-to-person offenses, whether the act in fact 
occurred, when there is no corroborating evidence, depends very much on the 
believability of the complaining witness. And though an administrative discharge 
proceeding is not held to the same high standard of proof as a criminal hearing, and 
hearsay evidence is not as tightly controlled as it is in civil court proceedings, 
nevertheless there remains a minimum level of proof that must be found in the 
record. . . . The greatest engine for truth, it has been written, is the opportunity to 
confront one’s accusers and to cross-examine them. In administrative proceedings 
such as this, the rules are modified to permit agency processes that are less formal 
than those of a law court. But that does not authorize a gross departure from basic 
principles as has occurred in this case. 
Id. at 1436–37 (citations omitted). 
 201. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (explaining the admissibility of 
hearsay in administrative hearings). 
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3. Crafting an Innovative Discovery Process.  The Dear 
Colleague Letter implicates, but unfortunately does not address, 
other evidentiary issues, creating further confusion for institutions, 
victims, and accused students. For instance, one problem that has 
emerged in many campus hearings has been the inability of the 
accused student to access relevant evidence to build an effective 
defense.202 The OCR, however, has not commented on whether an 
open discovery process is permissible. 
Generally speaking, the accused student should not have the 
power to compel testimony or to conduct mandatory pretrial 
depositions. These powers are inappropriate for the higher-education 
sexual-assault context because they would impose significant costs on 
the institution and serve to delay the process and undermine the 
institution’s need for discretion and inconspicuousness.203 
Additionally, in the sexual-assault context, compelled testimony may 
be traumatizing to the students who are forced to testify, particularly 
if relationships with either the victim or the accused are damaged as a 
result.204 These costs are not outweighed by either the first or second 
Mathews factor. The accused student’s liberty interest does not 
require an ability to drag unwilling witnesses to a disciplinary hearing 
or a deposition room, particularly in an administrative proceeding in 
which criminal punishment is not at stake. Although facts will vary 
from case to case, student-on-student sexual assault is often a 
witnessless crime, which means that depriving accused students of the 
subpoena or deposition powers will rarely jeopardize their ability to 
present a defense. Furthermore, FERPA’s requirements protect the 
victim’s academic record from being subjected to trial-like scrutiny,205 
making compelled discovery tools impractical. Accordingly, courts 
have recognized that far-reaching discovery techniques are 
inappropriate in the higher-education context.206 
Though certain discovery tools are inappropriate, some modicum 
of discovery is essential for due process. As Justice Brennan 
explained, discovery is important because it “helps develop a full 
 
 202. See, e.g., Cloud v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 726 (1st Cir. 1983) (addressing the 
accused’s complaints that he was not afforded access to relevant witnesses). 
 203. See, e.g., Danso v. Univ. of Conn., 919 A.2d 1100, 1108 (Super. Ct. Conn. 2007) (“Due 
process . . . does not require that a student at a disciplinary hearing be afforded a right 
to . . . compel testimony.”). 
 204. See supra notes 154, 200 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 206. Danso, 919 A.2d at 1108. 
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account of the relevant facts, helps detect and expose attempts to 
falsify evidence, and prevents factors such as surprise from 
influencing the outcome at the expense of the merits of the case.”207 
An innovative approach is necessary. At the very minimum—and as 
recognized by the Dear Colleague Letter208—the accused must have 
access to the evidence that will be presented at the hearing. This 
requirement finds support in all the Mathews factors.209 Moreover, this 
approach facilitates compliance with FERPA because it mandates 
that institutions turn over only the information that has been selected 
as admissible at the hearing, which presumably is also FERPA 
compliant. 
Additionally, other, more innovative discovery techniques could 
easily be adopted that would enrich due process without overly 
burdening the institution or the victim. First, although subpoenas are 
inappropriate, institutions should formally encourage witnesses to 
attend hearings by excusing them from class or scheduling hearings 
when school is in session, if timely. Second, nonstudent employees 
should be required to testify when requested because institutional 
employees must further the institution’s truth-seeking duty and, 
accordingly, being compelled to testify should be viewed as falling 
within the scope of employment. 
Second, the accused should be permitted to use optional written 
interrogatories when witnesses are unavailable or unwilling to 
participate in the hearing. Likewise, institutional officers should be 
willing to act on the accused student’s behalf to contact potential 
witnesses and ask questions for the purpose of reporting the contents 
of these conversations to the judicial panel. Such evidence might be 
hearsay, but hearsay evidence is permissible in this context.210 Some 
institutions already act on the accused student’s behalf during cross-
examination in campus adjudications,211 and this approach could 
 
 207. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 425 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 208. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 11 n.29. 
 209. This point should be somewhat axiomatic. First, the liberty interest at stake in 
disciplinary hearings is sufficient to warrant prior access to the facts. Second, without access to 
the factual evidence, the accused will be unable to mount an effective defense, dramatically 
increasing the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. Third, providing timely access to the 
accused will impose only minimal costs. This final point finds support in the Dear Colleague 
Letter itself. Id. 
 210. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (explaining that hearsay evidence 
may be admissible in the administrative hearing context). 
 211. See, e.g., Donohue v. Baker, 975 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (requiring cross-
examination to be conducted through the institution’s judicial panel); Cloud v. Trs. of Bos. 
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produce similar beneficial results during discovery. More importantly, 
by coordinating discovery from within the student-affairs office, the 
institution will be able to more carefully manage contact between the 
accused student and the alleged victim, hopefully preventing any 
antagonistic behavior by either party.212 Further, conducting discovery 
via the student-affairs office would be another way for the institution 
to ensure that the accused student is not seeking FERPA-protected 
information or harassing the victim. These techniques would 
supplement the institution’s own investigation into the accusation of 
sexual assault and would increase the amount of information that can 
be submitted to the disciplinary panel. Therefore, this innovative 
approach to discovery provides a way for the institution to balance its 
obligations to both the victim and the accused. 
4. Equal Treatment in Accessing Counsel.  The OCR has chosen 
to defer to the institution on the issue of whether counsel should be 
permitted at disciplinary hearings.213 Although this approach is better 
than simply issuing a directive without legal support—as the OCR did 
on the issue of cross-examination214—a more consistent standard is 
needed to ensure adequate protection of both the victim’s and the 
accused student’s interests. With this goal in mind, institutions should 
generally provide both the accused and the victim with the option, but 
not the right, to obtain legal counsel. For students who elect not to 
obtain legal counsel, a student or administrative advocate should be 
offered as an alternative. Such a regime is supported by Mathews 
because it comports with the magnitude of the interests at stake in the 
sexual-assault context and ensures that the students’ respective rights 
are meaningfully advanced.215 Further, allowing counsel does not pose 
a prohibitive burden under the third Mathews factor. In fact, many 
institutions already allow counsel for the accused.216 Others provide 
 
Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Cir. 1983) (involving cross-examination conducted with the victim 
shielded from view). 
 212. Institutions already try carefully to manage future interactions between the alleged 
victim and the accused. See supra note 160. Not only are such efforts important for the 
prevention of future trauma to the alleged victim, but in some instances, the institution might 
even be legally obligated to ensure that the parties refrain from future conduct so as to avoid a 
“hostile environment.” Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 4, 13 n.33. 
 213. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 215. See supra Part III.A. 
 216. See, e.g., Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 304 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Me. 2004) (involving a 
student represented by counsel). 
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student advocates.217 These solutions are adequate and provide the 
accused student the opportunity to consult with an adviser before 
mounting a defense. 
Although the parties should have the right to access counsel, this 
right should work in tandem with the ability of the counterparty to 
access counsel. In other words, when the accused can afford counsel 
but the victim cannot, then neither party should have counsel.218 In 
that situation, the institution should offer to each student the services 
of a competent student or administrative advocate of the parties’ 
choosing. Notably, this equal-representation approach would go 
further in protecting the victim than the OCR’s own policy, which 
mandates only equal formal access to counsel.219 By contrast, the 
equal-representation approach will ensure that neither party has a 
competitive advantage because of one party’s ability or willingness to 
pay. Admittedly, this approach steps outside the Mathews calculus by 
considering issues of fairness to the victim rather than focusing solely 
on the accused student’s due-process rights. This focus is appropriate, 
however, so long as the accused student is provided some form of 
representation. Beyond this baseline, fairness between the parties 
should be a relevant factor. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the OCR’s attempts to provide specific guidance to 
institutions of higher education on how to respond to accusations of 
peer sexual assault, numerous questions and conflicts remain. The 
basis for such confusion rests largely on the fact that Title IX must 
work in tandem with constitutionally or contractually defined due-
process rights, yet to date the OCR has not issued specific guidance 
on how these two bodies of law should interact. Other laws such as 
FERPA come into play at the margins and make matters even more 
complicated. This uncertainty is unacceptable, particularly given the 
weight of the interests involved. Therefore, the OCR should issue 
further guidance in the form of a model judicial policy that more 
 
 217. See Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 145–47 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing a campus 
disciplinary proceeding in which the accused student was provided access to a student 
advocate); Danso v. Univ. of Conn., 919 A.2d 1100, 1109 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (same). 
 218. Determining a party’s ability to afford legal counsel will be a fact-based assessment 
made by a student-affairs office. Such a decision may require the student or his or her guardian 
to authorize the relevant official to consult the student’s financial-aid profile. 
 219. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 5, at 12. 
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carefully outlines how due process and victim protection should 
interact. Ideally, such guidelines would spur Congress to provide 
corresponding legislative enactments that recognize the interplay 
between Title IX and due-process rights. 
In light of these interests, this Note argues for the 
implementation of a special due-process regime for sexual-assault 
adjudication on college and university campuses. These 
recommendations should be embraced by institutions, as they comply 
with the Mathews calculus and should be explicitly ratified by the 
OCR. Specifically, institutions should (1) adopt a preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard, as already recommended by the OCR; (2) 
provide accused students with the right to cross-examine all witnesses, 
subject to specific limits to protect the victim from undue 
embarrassment or stress; (3) implement a limited and innovative 
discovery process, in which the institution provides assistance to the 
accused while also permitting timely access to available factual 
evidence, subject to FERPA’s limitations; and (4) give both the 
accused and the victim the option, but not the right, to obtain legal 
counsel, but ensure that both parties have equal types of 
representation. 
By articulating and approving a regime of due-process rights for 
students accused of sexual assault—such as the type of regime 
proposed in this Note—the OCR would enable institutions to balance 
their obligations to both victims and accused students more carefully, 
thereby providing more adequate and far-reaching protection for 
both parties. 
